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Abstract 
In this paper, we consider typical applications in 
which the business logic is separated from the access 
control logic, implemented in an independent compo-
nent, called the Policy Decision Point (PDP). The 
execution of functions in the business logic should thus 
include calls to the PDP, which grants or denies the 
access to the protected resources/functionalities of the 
system, depending on the way the PDP has been confi-
gured. 
The task of testing the correctness of the implemen-
tation of the security policy is tedious and costly. In 
this paper, we propose a new approach to reuse and 
automatically transform existing functional test cases 
for specifically testing the security mechanisms. The 
method includes a three-step technique based on muta-
tion applied to security policies (RBAC, XACML, Or-
BAC) and AOP for transforming automatically func-
tional test cases into security policy test cases. The 
method is applied to Java programs and provides tools 
for performing the steps from the dynamic analyses of 
impacted test cases to their transformation. Three 
empirical case studies provide fruitful results and a 
first proof of concepts for this approach, e.g. by com-
paring its efficiency to an error-prone manual adapta-
tion task.  
 
1. Introduction 
Automatically transforming functional test cases in 
order to test another concern seems an open issue, 
while it would drastically reduce the testing effort: no 
more effort would be spent other than the one already 
paid when testing system functions. In this paper, we 
explore this issue in the case of security policy testing 
(the new concern/property to be tested). The intuition 
which makes the proposed approach feasible is based 
on two facts:  
- All security mechanisms are necessarily exer-
cised at least once by functional test cases if 
they cover 100% of the executable statements: 
the functional test sequences can thus be 
reused. Only the oracle function has to be 
transformed to test that the tested security me-
chanism behaves as expected, 
-   The typical access control logic is separated 
from the application code (business logic): 
this access control logic can thus be manipu-
lated or modified. 
Indeed,  in a typical application which embeds 
access control mechanisms, the business logic imple-
mentation is separated from the access control logic 
[1]. In such systems, the recommended architecture 
consists of designing a security component, called the 
Policy Decision Point (PDP), which can be configured 
independently from the rest of the application. The 
PDP is configured with respect to a security policy, 
modeled using an access control modeling language 
such as OrBAC or RBAC [2, 3] A security policy is 
composed of a set of access control rules, which speci-
fy the conditions for granting or denying access to 
protected elements. The execution of functions in the 
business logic should thus include calls to the PDP, 
which grants or denies the access to the protected re-
sources/functionalities of the system.  
From a security testing point of view, the issue is to 
determine the correctness of the interactions between 
the business logic and the PDP. The generation of test 
cases targeting security thus consists in generating a 
test sequence ending with a given access control call, 
and also relies on the creation of the oracle function. 
Observing that the execution of a given test sequence 
effectively leads to an access granted does not mean 
that a security mechanism has correctly checked the 
access rights for this specific call. To be fully efficient, 
the oracle should be built by observing the piece of 
code which corresponds to the call to the PDP. 
The problem we are tackling in this paper is related 
to the definition of an efficient oracle function for 
security test cases. In particular, we propose an ap-
proach to adapt existing functional test cases that al-
ready define relevant test scenarios, by updating their 
oracle to take security concerns into account.  
In [4], we studied the overlap between functional 
test cases (generated for testing the functions of the 
business logic) and the test cases needed to test all the 
security mechanisms. To adapt functional test cases, in 
order to take security into account, we need to identify 
test cases that trigger security mechanisms. Then, their 
oracle should be enhanced to also check that the trig-
gered security mechanisms work properly. This paper 
provides an automated solution for selecting functional 
test cases which are qualified to test security mechan-
isms. A dynamic analysis based on mutation of access 
control rules helps pinpointing which access control 
rules are already exercised by each test case. These 
rules need to be tested specifically by the security tests 
as outlined our previous work [4] 
Detecting the test cases impacted by a security rule 
(triggering at least one security mechanism) is also 
useful to perform regression testing on the parts of the 
policy that have not changed. It allows testing that the 
evolution has not introduced unexpected changes.  
In this paper, we propose a method and tools (1)  to 
detect the test cases which are impacted by a security 
policy and (2) transform existing functional test cases 
in security policy test cases.  
To reach this objective, several problems are 
treated incrementally: 
1. Select tests that are impacted by the security poli-
cy: this selection step aims at reducing the step 2 
execution times, we perform a conservative impact 
analysis 
2. for each selected test case, determine exactly 
which rules impact the test case, 
3. for each test case, modify and adapt the oracle to 
observe the security mechanism. 
At the end of this three-step process, the existing 
functional test cases that trigger security mechanisms 
are transformed into security policy test cases. The 
presented approach has been applied to Java programs.  
To validate the approach, we apply it to the case 
study presented in [4] and augmented with two other 
case studies. We study the feasibility of the approach 
and show the obtained results. In addition, we study the 
efficiency of our approach compared to a manual one. 
Also, we present to what extent the first selection step 
improves the performances of the approach regarding 
the execution times of the second step. 
Section 2 introduces the context of this work and 
defines important concepts that are used in this study. 
Section presents the overall process for selecting func-
tional test cases that trigger security mechanisms and 
adapt their oracle functions to take security concerns 
into account. Section 4 and 5 detail the two steps ana-
lyses performed to identify the relationships between 
functional test cases and security rules. Section 6 de-
tails how these test cases are adapted to consider secu-
rity and section 7 discusses the results obtained from 
the three case studies. 
2. Definitions and Context 
Before detailing the proposed approach, we need to 
provide a few fundamental concepts. In this section, 
we present the context and definitions of the important 
concepts. 
2.1. Context 
When building a software system that has specific 
requirements, the business logic and the security policy 
are usually modeled, analyzed and developed separate-
ly. The security policy is specified as a set of rules, 
according to one of the various access control languag-
es that are available (RBAC and variants such as 
XACML, OrBAC…). This abstract specification of the 
security policy allows reasoning about the rules and 
performing specific types of analyses on these rules. 
Eventually, the global system has to take into account 
both the business and the security concerns into a sin-
gle implementation. The security policy can be imple-
mented as a separate component called the Policy De-
cision Point (PDP) that interacts with the business 
logic through Policy Enforcement Points (PEP). Al-
though the PDP can be automatically generated from 
the security policy, the location of PEPs in the business 
logic has to be decided in an ad-hoc way to take into 
account specific design and implementation decisions. 
Security Policy
Busines logic
Policy Decision Point
Test cases
Policy Enforcement Point(PEP)
Automatic generation
 
Figure 1 – Context for testing a secured 
system 
Our goal is then to validate that PEPs are correct in 
the sense that they implement the desired interactions 
between the business logic and the PDP in order to 
enforce the security policy. In this work, we validate 
the integration of the security policy with the business 
logic through testing. More precisely we want to adapt 
existing functional test cases so that they can take secu-
rity into account when they check the correctness of 
the system.  Our concern in this paper is then to identi-
fy the test cases which cover PEPs, and thus trigger 
security mechanisms  
In [5], we propose a  model-based approach for 
specifying, deploying and testing an access control 
policy. The specification of the policy is performed 
according to a generic meta-model, which allows this 
policy to be expressed in any access control language 
(RBAC, OrBAC, DAC, MAC, XACML). The meta-
model includes generic mutations operators that define 
the semantic of mutation operators at the generic mod-
el. This framework allows us to produce mutants for 
any access control language that conforms to the ge-
neric model, for instance XACML. The generation of 
the PDP and the deployment is performed using sever-
al model-based tools (AOP, model transformation). 
The missing component for this fully automated 
framework is the generation of test cases that exercise 
the application code to guarantee that the access con-
trol policy is fully respected and implemented in the 
application internal code (no backdoors or hidden 
mechanisms [6]). 
2.2. Definitions 
We need to define or recall some definitions: 
Business Logic – The business logic is the part of the 
system which implements the system functionali-
ties.  
A security policy defines a set of security rules that 
specify rights and restrictions of actors on parts and 
resources of the system. A rule can be a permission or 
a prohibition. Each rule consists of five parameters 
(called entities):  a status flag S indicating permission 
or prohibition, a role, an activity, a view, and a context. 
Our domain consists of role names RN, activity names 
PN, view names VN, and context names CN.  
 
Security Policy (SP): A security policy SP is thus set of 
rules defined by CNVNPNRNSSP ××××⊆ . The 
signature of an access rule is thus: 
Status(Role, Activity, View, Context) 
Examples:  
Permission(Borrower,Borrow,Book,WordingDay) 
Prohibition(Borrower,Consult,PersonnelAccount, 
Default) 
Security mechanism – It denotes any piece of code or 
constraint internal to the business logic which re-
stricts (or relaxes) the access to some protected re-
sources/functions of the system. A specific case of 
security mechanism is called PEP, which explicitly 
calls the external PDP component (see the follow-
ing definitions).  
 
PEP - The Policy Enforcement Point is the point in the 
business logic where the policy decisions are en-
forced. It is a security mechanism, which has been 
intentionally inserted in the business logic code. 
On call of a service that is regulated by the security 
policy, the PEP sends a request to the PDP to get 
the suitable response for the requested service by 
the user and in the current context. Based on the re-
sponse of the PDP, if the access is granted the ser-
vice executes, and if the access is denied the PEP 
forbids the execution of the service. 
 
PDP - The Policy Decision Point is the point where 
policy decisions are made. It encapsulates the 
Access Control Policy and implements a mechan-
ism to process requests coming from the PEP and 
return a response which can be deny or permit. 
 
System/functional testing – the activity which consists 
of generating and executing test cases which are 
produced based on the uses cases and the business 
models (e.g. analysis class diagram and dynamic 
views) of the system. By opposition with security 
tests, we call these tests functional.  
Security policy testing (SP testing): it denotes the ac-
tivity of generating and executing test cases that 
are derived specifically from a SP. The objective of 
SP testing is to reveal as many security flaws as 
possible. 
Test case: In the paper, we define a test case as a trip-
let: intent, input test sequence, oracle function.  
Intent of a test case: The intent of a test case is the 
reason why an input test sequence and an oracle 
function are associated to test a specific aspect of a 
system. It includes at least the following informa-
tion:  (functional, names of the tested functions) for 
functional test cases or (SP, names of the tested se-
curity rules) for SP ones. 
Test cases aim at detecting security flaws in the 
systems under test. In this paper, the faults (or “flaws”) 
can be classified into two main categories. 
Security faults - interaction faults and hidden secu-
rity mechanisms. Security interaction faults occur 
when the interactions between the business logic im-
plementation and the PDP is erroneous. Interaction 
faults thus correspond to a fault in the security mechan-
ism itself (and maybe its absence at a given point in the 
software). It may be caused by manual modifications in 
the business logic code (e.g. adding manually an unex-
pected call to the PDP, erroneous parameters) or to 
error in the use of AOP if this technique is used to 
insert the PEP code. Such faults may generate unex-
pected interactions between the business logic and the 
PDP. Hidden security mechanisms correspond to de-
sign constraints or pieces of code which may bypass 
the PEP which is expected to control the access for a 
specific execution. 
 
SP oracle function: The oracle function for a SP test 
case is a specific assertion which interrogates the 
security mechanism. There are two different oracle 
functions: 
- For permission, the oracle function checks 
that the service is activated (access 
granted).  
- For a prohibition, the oracle checks that 
the service is not activated (access de-
nied).  
The intent of the functional tests is not to observe 
that a security mechanism is executed correctly. For 
instance, for an actor of the system who is allowed to 
access a given service, the functional test intent con-
sists of making this actor execute this service. Indirect-
ly, the permission check mechanism has been ex-
ecuted, but a specific oracle function must be added to 
transform this functional test into a SP test. 
Adaptation of a functional test case – The adapta-
tion of a functional test case consists of (1) modifying 
its intent, (2) identifying the security rules the test 
sequence triggers and (3) adding the SP oracle func-
tion.  
Point 2 is obtained by determining which test cases 
are impacted by the security policy, and more precisely 
by a given security rule. 
Impacted Test case – A test case is said to be im-
pacted by the security policy, if its execution triggers at 
least one of the PEPs in the business code. A test case 
is said to be impacted by a security rule R of the secu-
rity policy if it triggers at least one of the PEPs with 
the parameters corresponding to the security rule R. A 
test case which is impacted by a security rule is ob-
viously impacted by the security policy.  
3. Overview of the approach 
Figure 2 presents the methodology. First we identi-
fy the test cases which are not impacted by the security 
policy and remove them from the initial set of test 
cases. Second, we analyze the impacted test cases in 
order to precisely associate the security rules impacting 
each test case. Then we adapt each functional test case 
by adding a new oracle function, specific to the securi-
ty mechanism under test. This new oracle function 
checks that the correct PEP is executed and that the 
access is granted/denied consistently with the security 
policy. 
In both steps, the analysis is performed dynamically. 
First, a single execution of all the test cases allows 
identifying which test case impacts at least an access 
control mechanism. It thus selects the test cases which 
are qualified for testing security, in order to reduce the 
effort needed to perform the second step analysis. This 
step optimizes the number of test cases to be run in the 
second step (especially when the test set is large).  
In the second step, we perform a mutation analysis 
which requires executing the test cases for each mu-
tant. We systematically inject errors in every security 
rule in order to create mutant PDPs. This analysis is a 
kind of sensitivity analysis [7], and allows locating 
precisely the relationships linking a test case to  securi-
ty policy rules in the PDP. If the behavior is the same 
when executing the test case on the initial and modified 
PDP, then it means it is not impacted. We execute 
every test case with every mutant. When a test case 
kills a mutant m, it means that it is impacted by the rule 
that has been modified to generate m. This mutation 
analysis thus allows us to associate each impacted test 
case with a set of security rules that are covered by this 
test case. 
  
Step 1 
Conservative 
impact analysis
Impacted 
Test Suite 
(TS2)
Test1 
+
Mapping between tests and 
impacting rules
Test1 R2, R4
Test6 R8
Test3 R3, R5, R6
Test2 R1, R2, R4
Test7 R7,R8
Step 2
Mapping rules to 
test cases
security test suite (TS3)
Test1  + security oracle
Step 3
Adding the security oracle
Impacted test suite (TS2)
Test1 
Test6 
Test5 
Test3 
Test4 
Test2 
Test7
Impacted test suite (TS2)
Test1 
Test6 
Test3 
Test2 
Test7
Test2  + security oracle
Test6
Test3 
Test2 
Test7 Test7  + security oracle
Test6  + security oracle
Test3  + security oracle
 
Figure 2 - Overview of the three steps 
 
We assume that the PDP is controllable. Controlla-
bility means that the rules in the PDP can be easily 
modified. In this paper, we consider that the PDP is a 
separate component. This property is needed to modify 
the rules and check the sensitivity of the test cases 
execution to changes in the PDP. The PDP security 
rules can be implemented in several ways, e.g.  in a 
database or in XACML. In this paper we use the envi-
ronment proposed in [8] to modify the security rules in 
PDP implemented in several languages (OrBAC, 
RBAC).  
Based on our previous work [5], we are able to 
claim that this assumption is realistic. By using our 
generic approach, we are now able to modify the rules 
of policies expressed in different language (RBAC, 
OrBAC or XACML).  
 4. Selecting test cases that trigger securi-
ty rules  
In the first step of our process, we perform a dy-
namic analysis to select the subset of test cases that are 
impacted by the SP. The objective of the first dynamic 
analysis is to filter the test cases which are not im-
pacted by the security policy. One test case is consi-
dered to be impacted by the SP if it triggers a PEP 
during its execution. It is an optimization step which is 
used to make this second dynamic analysis less time 
and resource consuming. Experiments of Section 7 will 
show the benefits of using this first step (test cases 
selection) compared to a direct use of the second step 
(test cases impact analysis).  
 
Figure 3 -  First step: test cases selection 
 
As shown in Figure 2, the first test selection in-
volves two steps. 
We start by producing a special mutant policy 
which replaces each rule from the initial policy with its 
opposite rule. We replace permissions with prohibi-
tions and prohibitions with permissions, and we re-
place the default policy decision by its opposite as 
well. We end up with a mutated access control policy 
that contains only faulty rules. In the security mecha-
nism, we use this policy instead of the initial one. Then 
tests are run on the system containing this new mutated 
policy in its security mechanism. Tests that exercise 
functionalities protected by the security mechanism are 
expected to fail due to the several errors injected in the 
policy. These tests are selected as impacted by the 
security policy because they fail if the policy is errone-
ous. This is a conservative approach, since we are sure 
that the test cases that kill mutants are impacted.  We 
cannot assess that test cases that pass are not impacted 
by the security policy mechanism.  
5. Relating test cases and security rules 
To perform this analysis, we applied mutation 
adapted to access control policies, we proposed in a 
previous work [9]. The mutation approach is recalled, 
then the second step dynamic analysis (test cases im-
pact on security policy rules) is detailed. 
5.1. Mutation applied to security policies 
Mutation analysis is a technique for evaluating the 
quality of test cases [10]. We proposed several muta-
tion operators that are applied to the security policy 
model and are thus independent from implementation-
specific details. This approach has the advantage of 
defining faults that are actually related to the definition 
of security rules (prohibition instead of permission, 
wrong role, etc.). We assume that there is a direct link 
between these SP rules (specification level) and the 
corresponding PDP (implementation level). This is 
why the PDP has to be controllable. In [8], a solution 
to derive directly the PDP from the security policy 
language has been presented based on a common me-
tamodel to the languages and the mutation operators. 
Another  
The mutation operators inject mutation faults to the 
SP. The approach was firstly applied to OrBAC (Or-
ganization Based access control [2]), and extended to 
RBAC and XACML like code [8]. Four types of muta-
tion operators were proposed: 
• Type changing operators: Turn one permis-
sion rule to a prohibition (PPR) or one prohibition to a 
permission (PRP). 
• Parameter changing operators: Take one rule, 
and replace one of its parameters with a different one. 
• Hierarchy changing operators: Replace a rule 
with one of its descendants. 
• Adding rules operator: Add a new rule (ANR), 
using a combination of parameters and status that is not 
is the defined rules. 
5.2. Detecting test cases impacted by a rule   
In this second step, we map test cases to the securi-
ty rules they trigger. The second step dynamic analysis 
is used to build these relationships. While it could be 
done with other techniques (e.g. by comparing the 
execution traces, regression testing techniques), we 
choose to use the mutation approach we proposed 
previously [9] to make this analysis possible. As shown 
in Figure 4, it has the advantage to be non intrusive in 
the business logic. No assumptions are needed con-
cerning the PEP ‘observability’ and the way the securi-
ty mechanisms are coded in the business logic. In fact, 
the business logic is treated as a black box which inte-
racts with the PDP. The idea is to perform some “sensi-
tivity analysis” [7] by modifying the PDP security 
rules and check whether the execution of a test case is 
impacted by this change. Thus, the mutation analysis is 
used to create a variant version of the PDP: it could be 
done using Xie’s mutation technique on XACML code 
[11] or even manually if the number of rules is not too 
large.  
The executions (on the initial reference version and 
on the mutated ones) of a test case i are compared: a 
difference means that the change in the PDP has im-
pacted the execution of test case i. In other words, it 
means that the initial execution triggers the PEP related 
to the security rule (recall that a PEP is a security me-
chanism which explicitly calls the PDP). At this stage, 
we don’t need to know whether the initial execution 
result is correct or not from the security point of view 
(is the correct rule called? Is the result of the PDP 
taken into account by the business logic code?). It is 
just necessary to determine the test cases exercising a 
PEP related to a given security rule. 
PDP
Mutant PDP
Rule j mutated
Business logic + PEPs
Test case i
m1();
m2();
…
mN();
Business logic + PEPs
Reference outputs
equals?
Mutant outputs
If different
=> Test Case i is impacted by Rule j
 
Figure 4 - Second step: dynamic analysis 
of test cases impact on security mechanisms 
using mutation 
 
When a test case TC is executed, the PEP sends a 
request to the PDP that evaluates a security rule Rj 
which impacts the behavior of the test case: using 
mutation, we can determine that rule Rj is evaluated by 
the PDP when the test case is executed. 
For detecting the impacted test cases by a security 
rule, the first operators are sufficient. The two other 
categories of operators could be used for a more pre-
cise analysis. The ANR operator is not used either 
since existing functional test cases are unlikely testing 
the robustness of the security policy in terms of de-
fault/unspecified behavior (which is the reason why the 
ANR operator is used). Since this operator is costly, we 
do not use it, even if it may be used to identify the test 
case which may be transformed in advanced security 
test cases (see [4]) for testing the robustness of the 
security policy. 
We generate a set of mutant policies in the PDP by: 
- Applying PPR (prohibition to permission) and 
PRP (permission to prohibition),  
- Executing the test cases on each mutant. 
If a test case fails with a particular mutant, this re-
veals that the test case is actually impacted by the rule 
that has been mutated in this mutant.  
6. Oracle modification in the functional 
test case 
We propose three different levels of quality to im-
plement the oracle function. As stated in Table 1, the 
first level of oracle just checks that no obvious incon-
sistency exists between the current security policy and 
the implementation of the system. Level 1 oracle func-
tion is “black-box” in the sense no information is 
needed to build it except the status of the rule(s) im-
pacted by the test case. If the tested rule corresponds to 
a prohibition, the oracle must check that an exception 
or a specific message is raised. For a permission, the 
oracle checks that no such exception is raised.  
Table 1. The three quality level of oracle functions 
Oracle 
level 
Assumptions Check that.. 
 
1 
 
no 
(black box) 
the access is 
granted/denied w.r.t. the 
rules (1) 
 
 
2 
 
Observable 
PDP 
(“Business 
logic + PEPs” 
is a black box) 
- (1) 
- the PDP is correctly 
called (2)  
 
 
3 
 
Observable 
PDP and 
Observable 
PEP 
(glass-box) 
- (1) 
- the PDP and the ex-
pected PEP are correctly 
interacting (the right PEP 
calls the PDP with the 
expected parameters). 
 
Level 2 oracle extends the basic level 1 oracle func-
tion by observing the PDP logs. The oracle then relates 
the oracle 1 results with the execution of the expected 
rule in the PDP. This allows detecting hidden mechan-
ism. For example if the PDP is bypassed due to a hid-
den mechanism, this is the only way to detect that a 
permission has been effectively granted by the PDP.   
Level 2 oracle is especially useful to detect hidden 
security mechanisms. 
Level 3 oracle extends level 1 and check that no 
unexpected interactions occur between the PEP which 
is expected to send a request to the PDP and the PDP. 
Level 3 oracle is thus a good way to detect interaction 
faults. 
In this paper, we automated the weaving of level 2 
oracle functions in the impacted test cases using As-
pectJ. To make this process possible, the security poli-
cy is taken as an input to determine whether the ex-
pected result is ‘permission’ or ‘prohibition’ (level 1 
oracle). The automation is possible only because we 
force the PEP, which has been woven using AOP, to 
raise a specific exception when the access is prohi-
bited. With such a constraint, capturing the access 
status is feasible as well as comparing it with the rule 
status of the security policy (specification). Figure 2 
presents a test case after the modification.  The PDP is 
observable and logs coming from the business logic are 
observed. The security oracle retrieves the PEP log and 
compares it with an expected log according to the rules 
that are impacting the test (obtained by the second step 
impact analysis). 
/**
* Test for method borrow
*
*/
public void testBorrow() {
try {
// init test data
Book book = new Book("book title");
Teacher teacher = new Teacher("teacher1");
// teacher borrow book
bookService.borrowBook(teacher, book);
// functional oracle
// test if borrowed and no longer reserved
assertTrue(teacher.getBorrowed().contains(book));
// test if data was well stored in DB 
bookReturned = bookDAO.loadBook("book title");
asserEqualsTrue(bookReturned.getCurrentStateString()
,Book.BORROWED));
} catch (BSException e) {
fail(e.getMessage());
} catch (SecuritPolicyViolationException e) {          
fail(e.getMessage());
}
// Security oracle 
// get the rules impacting this test
String rules = getRulesImpactedByTests("testBorrow");
// get both expected and return log
String peplogExpected = getExpectedPEPLog(rules);
String pepLogReturned = readPEPLog();
// security oracle
assertEquals(pepLogReturned,peplogExpected);
}
Test sequence
Existing
functional oracle
Woven level 2 
security oracle
 
Figure 5 - Woven security oracle function 
7. Experiments and results 
The objectives of the experiments are to: 
- Study the information provided by the two steps. 
In particular, we will study the interest of the first 
step of test selection in the methodology. 
- compare various solutions to obtain security policy 
test cases: 
o Manual creation of SP test cases 
o Manual adaptation of functional test cases 
o Automated detection of impacted test cases 
and manual modification of the oracle 
o Fully automated approach. 
7.1. Presentation of case studies 
We applied our approach on three Java case studies 
applications previously developed by students during 
group projects and used in a computer science course 
in the university of Rennes 1: 
LMS: The library management system (LMS) of-
fers services to manage books in a public library (see 
[4] for details). 
VMS: The virtual meeting system offers simplified 
web conference services. The virtual meeting server 
allows the organization of work meetings on a distri-
buted platform. 
ASMS (Auction Sale Management System): The 
ASMS allows users to buy or sell items online. A seller 
can start an auction by submitting a description of the 
item he wants to sell and a minimum price (with a start 
date and an ending date for the auction). Then usual 
bidding process can apply and people can bid on this 
auction. One of the specificities of this system is that a 
buyer must have enough money in his account before 
bidding. 
The two last studies have been presented in [6] for 
studying the issue of hidden security mechanisms. 
Table 2 gives some information about the size of the 
three applications (the number of classes, methods and 
lines of code).  
Table 2. The size of the three applications 
 # classes # methods LOC 
(exec. statements) 
LMS 62 335 3204 
VMS 134 581 6077 
ASMS 122 797 10703 
7.2. Examples 
Figure 6 presents an example of the approach. An 
access control rule Ri mutated to R’i by switching the 
rule status into “permission”. The mutated policy 
makes the test case ‘testBorrowBookInMaintenanceDay’ fail 
because the applied rule is ‘permission’ while the rule 
expected to be applied is “prohibition”. In other words, 
the case expected an exception or an error message for 
borrowing a book during a maintenance day. It does 
not get this behaviour due to the mutated rule that was 
applied instead of the correct one. 
  
 
 
(1) Existing policy 
R1 
R2 
; 
Ri = prohibition(borrower,borrow,book,maintenance_day) 
; 
_______________________________________ 
 
(2) Mutated policy 
R1 
R2 
; 
R’i = permission(borrower,borrow,book,maintenance_day) 
; 
_______________________________________ 
  
(3) Impacted test found 
 
Test case: testBorrowBookInMaintenanceDay()    
 
Figure 6 – Example of rule and impacted 
test case 
7.3. Results 
In this section, we show the various steps of the 
process. The functional test cases have been produced 
either manually or using the use case system testing 
approach of [12]. The generation process stopped when 
100% of code coverage was reached.    
a  First step impact analysis results 
Table 3 shows the number/percentage of test cases 
which can be filtered thanks to the first step of test 
filtering. The execution times are less than one second 
for the three applications (between 0.5s and 1s) and 
thus can be considered as negligible in our studies. 
Around 20 to 30 % of the test cases can be identified 
not impacted by the access control policy. 
Table 3. First step analysis results 
System Impacted 
Tests 
Other Tests  All 
VMS 41 11 (21%) 52 
ASMS 85 38 (31%) 123 
LMS 19 7 (27%)  26 
The first step allows saving some execution time 
when using the second step dynamic analysis. We 
measured the execution time with and without the first 
step of test selection. Without the first step, the impact 
analysis is performed on all tests cases, and then only 
on test cases selected by the first step. As shown in 
Table 4, the relative saved time is significant (and 
reflects the percentage of filtered test cases). This first 
step reduces the execution time of the second one. The 
execution time of the first step (test selection) is neg-
lected. For instance, on a real enterprise information 
system, the execution time of a test case may be impor-
tant, and a relative 20-35 % of saved execution time 
becomes interesting.   
Table 4. Execution time with/without the first analysis 
Application Without 1st 
step 
With 1st  
step 
% Saved 
time 
VMS 30.5 s 24,3 s 20.4 % 
SMS 114.1 s 74.6 s  34.6 %   
LMS 19.3 16.4 15 % 
b Second step: test impact analysis results 
Table 5 shows examples of the results that we get 
by this analysis. For each test case, the analysis pin-
points the exact rules that are impacting it. 
Table 5. Examples of detailed results 
Tests #  rules Rules 
Test for the LMS: 
testBorrow2Borrower() 4 
1. Permission(Teacher, GiveBack, 
Book, WorkingDays) 
2. Permission (Teacher, Borrow, 
Book, WorkingDays) 
3. Permission (Student, GiveBack, 
Book, WorkingDays) 
4. Permission (Student, Borrow, 
Book, WorkingDays) 
Test for VMS: 
testUpdateUserAccount() 3 
1. Permission (Webmaster, Update, 
Account, MaintenanceDay) 
2. Permission (Admin, Update,  
Account, MaintenanceDay) 
3. Permission (Personnel, Update, 
Account, MaintenanceDay) 
Test for ASMS: 
testOpenSale_0() 2 
1. Permission (Seller, CreateSale, 
Bid, default) 
Permission (Seller, Update, Bid, 
default) 
In addition to the previous table, it is possible to 
find out for each rule the corresponding impacted tests. 
Furthermore, we can analyze more the results and 
observe the number of tests that are impacted by one 
rule or two or three etc. In Table 6, we show the result 
for the VMS application. For instance, there are 9 tests 
that are impacted by only one rule (each test is im-
pacted by only one rule). 
Table 6. Tests and impacting rule for VMS application 
# Tests # Impacting Rules 
9 1 
12 2 
2 3 
9 4 
1 5 
5 6 
1 7 
1 8 
7.4. Comparing several degrees of automa-
tion 
We conducted an experiment to compare between 
manual and automated approaches and to estimate the 
efforts in terms of time spent in obtaining the final test 
suite. We considered 4 scenarios:  
(1) Manually creating, from scratch, all the sec. tests,  
(2) Adapting manually existing tests (without step 1),  
(3) Adapting manually only selected tests (using the 
first step of the approach),  
(4) fully automated approach (steps 1, 2 and 3).  
Two graduate students were in charge of perform-
ing these scenarios. Not all the test cases have been 
created manually since more than 50% of functional 
test cases were generated using the use case driven 
approach of [12]. However, the students reported the 
time spent in the remaining manual tasks. We count in 
hours of intensive work, which is a lower bound of the 
real effort that would be needed. Table 7 displays the 
results showing the interest of the automation. In the 
three cases studies,, the creation of test cases dedicated 
to security is very important since it includes the iden-
tification of what should be tested and the elaboration 
of the test sequence. The cost of adapting the test cases 
selected using the steps 1 and 2 dynamic analyses is 
still important. Even if allows to significantly reduce 
the work of analysis which is needed to determine 
manually which functional test is impacted by a securi-
ty rule, the remaining task consists in modifying sys-
tematically the oracle in the test cases. The fully auto-
mated approach is very efficient but can only be ap-
plied in a process where the PEP sends specific mes-
sages when an access is denied. The install time of the 
various tools and environments for performing the 
automated treatments has not been measured but is 
done once. Even taking into account the bias due to the 
expertise degree of the students (and all other subjec-
tive factors), the benefit of automation seems high. 
Table 7. Automated and  manual approaches 
 LMS VMS ASMS 
(1)Creating 
all tests 
32 hours 48 hours 64 hours 
(2)Adapting 
manually all 
existing tests 
8 hours 16 hours 24 hours 
(3)Adapting 
selected tests 
1 hour 3 hours 4.5 hours 
(4)Fully 
automated 
5 min + install 
time 
10 min + 
install time 
13 min + 
install time 
8. Related works 
As far as we know, no previous work studies how 
to automatically adapt and reuse functional tests for SP 
testing. However, several works proposed techniques 
and tools for automatically testing the PDP implemen-
tation for security policies written in XACML [13, 14] 
or RBAC [15]. Fisler et al. proposed Magrave a tool 
for analyzing XACML policies and performing 
change-impact analysis [16]. The tool can be used for 
regression testing to identify the differences between 
two versions of the policies and test the PDP. In [17], 
Xie et al. proposed a new tool Cirg that automatically 
generates test for XACML policies using Change-
Impact Analysis. 
The main difference between their work and ours is 
that they focus on the PDP alone and testing consists of 
sending request and getting responses that are com-
pared to the expected ones. We consider the whole 
system (PDP+PEP) and adapt functional tests to vali-
date the implementation of the security policy. Both 
works are thus complementary. In fact, it is necessary 
to begin with making sure that the implementation of 
the PDP is correct and that the PDP responds as ex-
pected according to the specification, before consider-
ing the whole system. However, it is obvious that test-
ing the PDP in a separate way does not guarantee that 
the application behind it actually implements correctly 
the access control policy. We cannot assume that the 
application behaves as expected by the access control 
policy by only checking the front door (the PDP+PEP).  
For instance, the internal application code (the business 
code) may contain backdoors that bypass the PDP. 
Testing the PDP independently does not allow these 
backdoors to be detected and removed. In addition, as 
we have previously pointed out [5], applications may 
contain hidden doors (that we called hidden mechan-
isms) which implement access control rule in a non-
documented ways. These hidden doors can be detected 
only by testing the whole system w.r.t. the access con-
trol policy. For all these reasons, it is absolutely impor-
tant to test the whole system. 
Even if the idea of estimating the impact of test 
cases is not new (see [18] for design choices), no pre-
vious work specifically studies how to automatically 
adapt and reuse functional tests for SP testing. 
9. Conclusion and Future Work 
In this paper, we presented a new automated ap-
proach for selecting and adapting the functional tests in 
the context of SP testing. The approach includes a 
three steps process. The first step uses a special mutant 
of the policy having all its rules mutated. This step 
helps selecting the subset of tests impacted by the 
access control policy. The second step uses single 
mutations to provide a mapping between tests and the 
triggered SP rules. According to the mapping, AOP is 
used to transform them into security test cases by 
weaving the security policy oracle function. The ap-
proach was successfully implemented and applied to 
three case studies. The experimental results show the 
effectiveness of the approach when compared to a 
manual one.  
In further work, we will study regression testing in 
the case of a security policy evolution:  the second step  
(impact analysis) can be used for selecting and adapt-
ing security tests with respect to the security policy 
modification. In addition, one of the main issues is 
access control tests automation. This issue can be ad-
dressed using combinatorial [19] or computational 
intelligence algorithms [20, 21]  and will be studies in 
future work.   
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